un security council resolution 1737

“The Security Council,
“Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,
“Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
“Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran’s nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,
“Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General’s report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran’s nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
“Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General’s report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,
“Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General’s reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,
“Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,
“Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,
“Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
“Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
“1. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;
“2. Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:
(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;
“3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:
(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:
(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;
(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;
(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;
(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:
(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;
(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;
“5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:
(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;
“6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;
“7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;
“8. Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;
“9. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran’s technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:
(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and
(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein “the Annex”), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;
“11. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
“12. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;
“13. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:
(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;
(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
“14. Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
“15. Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:
(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;
(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;
and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;
“16. Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;
“17. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“18. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 17 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
“19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;
“20. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
“21. Welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;
“22. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;
“23. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
“24. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
“25. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”
Resolution Annex
A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme
1. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Arak)
3. Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
5. Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity, some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in the nuclear programme)
B. Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
2. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
3. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate entity of AIO)
C. Persons involved in the nuclear programme
1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager ( Arak)
3. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
4. Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz
5. Jafar Mohammadi, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of managing the production of valves for centrifuges)
6. Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company
7. Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar University of Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted experiments on beryllium)
D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)
2. Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO
3. Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO
E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes
1. Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)

Europian court of justice statement on iranian mojahedin

Press and Information

PRESS RELEASE No° 97/06
12 December 2006
Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-228/02

Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council of the European Union


THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ANNULS THE COUNCIL’S DECISION ORDERING THE FREEZING OF THE FUNDS OF THE ORGANISATION DES MODJAHEDINES DU PEUPLE D’IRAN IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

The contested decision infringes the right to a fair hearing, the obligation to state reasons and the right to effective judicial protection

On 28 September 2001, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling on all Member States of the UN to combat terrorism and the financing of terrorism by all means, in particular by freezing the funds of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts.
That resolution did not, however, identify the persons and entities in question, leaving that assessment to the Member States to determine.

That resolution has been implemented in the Community through a common position1 and a regulation2 of the Council, adopted on 27 December 2001, which ordered the freezing of the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons and entities included in a list established and regularly updated by Council decisions. Inclusion on the list is to be done on the basis of precise information or material in the file which indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent national authority, usually a judicial authority, in respect of the persons and entities concerned, irrespective of whether it concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act, an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and credible evidence or clues, or a finding of guilt in respect of such deeds. The names of persons and entities on the list are to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least once every six months to ensure that there are still grounds for keeping them on the list.
The Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI, People’s Mujahidin of Iran), was founded in 1965 and set itself the objective of replacing the regime of the Shah of Iran, then the mullahs’ regime, by a democracy. In the past, it has had an armed branch operating
1 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344, p. 93).
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344, p. 70).
inside Iran. It has stated, however, that it has expressly renounced all military activity since June 2001.
By a common position and a decision of 2 May 2002, the Council updated the list of persons and entities whose funds were to be frozen as part of the fight against terrorism, including, among others, the OMPI. Since then, the Council has adopted a number of common positions and decisions updating the list in question. The OMPI has always been maintained on the list.
The OMPI brought an action before the Court of First Instance seeking annulment of those common positions and decisions, in so far as those acts concern it.
The Court finds that certain fundamental rights and safeguards, including the right to a fair hearing, the obligation to state reasons and the right to effective judicial protection, are, as a matter of principle, fully applicable in the context of the adoption of a Community decision to freeze funds under Regulation No 2580/2001.
In this respect, the Court draws a distinction between the present case and the cases concerning the freezing of funds of persons and entities linked to Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taleban, which were the subject-matter of the judgments in Yusuf and Kadi of 21 September 20053 and also the judgments in Ayadi and Hassan of 12 July 2006.4 In those cases, the Council and the Commission had merely transposed at Community level resolutions of the Security Council and decisions of its Sanctions Committee which identified the persons concerned by name, without the Community institutions having any discretionary power as to the appropriateness or well-foundedness of those measures. By contrast, in the system at issue in the present case, the Security Council left it to the discretion of the UN Members to carry out the specific identification of the persons and entities whose funds are to be frozen. That identification thus involves the exercise of the Community’s own powers, entailing a discretionary appreciation by the Community. In those circumstances, the Council is in principle bound to observe the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Community legal order.
Next, the Court defines the scope of those rights and safeguards, and also the restrictions which may be imposed on them when a Community measure freezing funds is adopted.
The Court holds that the general principle of observance of the right to a fair hearing does not require that the persons concerned be heard by the Council when an initial decision to freeze their funds is adopted, as it must be able to benefit from a surprise effect. However, that principle does require that, unless precluded by overriding considerations concerning the security of the Community and its Member States, or the conduct of their international relations, the parties concerned must be informed of the specific information or material in the file which indicates that a decision has been taken in respect of them by a competent authority of a Member State, in so far as reasonably possible, either concomitantly with or as soon as possible after the adoption of such a decision. Subject to the same reservations, the parties concerned must be afforded the opportunity to make known effectively their view on any subsequent decision to maintain a freeze on funds.
Likewise, unless precluded by overriding considerations concerning the security of the Community and its Member States, or the conduct of their international relations, the
3 See Press Release No 79/05 of 21 September 2005.
4 See Press Release No 57/06 of 12 July 2006.
statement of reasons for an initial or subsequent decision to freeze funds must at least make actual and specific reference to the specific information or material in the file which indicates that a decision has been taken in respect of them by a competent authority of a Member State. That statement must also state the reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure must be taken in respect of the parties concerned.
Lastly, the right to effective judicial protection is effectively ensured by the right the parties concerned have to bring an action before the Court against any decision to freeze their funds or maintain the freeze on their funds. However, given the broad discretion enjoyed by the Council in this area, the review carried out by the Court of the lawfulness of such decisions must be restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power.
Applying those principles to the facts of the present case, the Court notes, first, that the relevant legislation does not explicitly provide for any procedure for notification of the evidence adduced or for a hearing of the parties concerned, either before or concomitantly with the adoption of an initial decision to freeze their funds or, in the context of the adoption of subsequent decisions, with a view to having them removed from the list.
Next, the Court finds that at no time before the action was brought was the evidence adduced against the OMPI notified to it. Neither the initial decision to freeze its funds nor subsequent decisions to maintain that freeze even mention the specific information or material in the file showing that a decision justifying its inclusion on the disputed list was taken in respect of it by a competent national authority.
The Court infers therefrom that the decisions in question do not contain sufficient statements of reasons.
Not only has the OMPI been unable effectively to make known its views to the Council but, in the absence of any statement, in the contested decision, of the actual and specific grounds justifying that decision, it has not been placed in a position to avail itself of its right of action before the Court.
Moreover, neither the file material produced before the Court, nor the responses given at the hearing by the Council and the United Kingdom in response to the questions put by the Court, enable it to conduct its judicial review, since it is not even in a position to determine with certainty exactly which is the national decision on which the contested decision is based.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the decision ordering the freezing of the OMPI’s funds does not contain a sufficient statement of reasons and that it was adopted in the course of a procedure during which the right of the party concerned to a fair hearing was not observed, and that it is not in a position to review the lawfulness of that decision. Accordingly that decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the OMPI.
REMINDER: An appeal, limited to points of law only, may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities against a decision of the Court of First Instance, within two months of its notification.
Unofficial document for media use, not binding on the Court of First Instance.
Languages available: ES CS DE EN FR HU PL SK SL
The full text of the judgment may be found on the Court’s internet site

http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=T-228/02
It can usually be consulted after midday (CET) on the day judgment is delivered.
For further information, please contact Christopher Fretwell Tel: (00352) 4303 3355 Fax: (00352) 4303 2731

Mullahs hanged a political prisoner

Iran hangs political prisoner
Wed. 15 Feb 2006
United Press InternationalTEHRAN, Feb. 15 (UPI) -- Hojjat Zamani, a political prisoner and member of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran in Gohardasht prison in Karaj, west of Tehran was hanged Feb. 7. Zamani was under torture and pressure since 2001, for five years. Ali Haji Kazem, the warden of Gohardasht prison, and two others known as Arjmandi and Seyyed, an executive deputy for implementation of the verdicts, were among those involved in the execution. The 6th branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Court had already condemned Hojjat to four executions, in summer 2004. At the end of the same year, a two-man branch of the Supreme Court consisting of mullah Mohseni Ezheii, the incumbent Minister of Intelligence, and Nabi Raji used many false allegations and condemned Hojjat to two times executions and full payment of blood money. Zamani, 31 at the time of hanging, underwent the most severe physical and psychological torture. The clerical regime's henchmen sought to break his morale and compel him to express remorse and surrender. To this end, they sent him to the cell block where ordinary and very dangerous prisoners were held. Zamani protested against this condition and went on hunger strike several times in 2004 and 2005. His conditions were a cause of concern in recent years, protested to by international human rights organizations and reflected in the media.

IAEA's text of the resolution on iran

By The Associated Press Sat Feb 4, 10:19 AM ET
Excerpts of the text of the resolution on Iran submitted by European nations to the 35-nation board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency International Atomic Energy Agency referring it Saturday to the U.N. Security Council U.N. Security Council.
___
The Board of Governors ...
(f) Recalling that ... the Director General noted that after nearly three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear program or to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
(g) Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other issues ...
(m) Recognizing that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's program by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for Iran to:
• re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and processing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
• reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
• ratify promptly and implement in full Additional Protocol;
• pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003; ...
3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify ... the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and, noting that the decision to put this document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;
4. Deeply regrets that ... Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006;
5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of confidence in Iran's intentions in seeking to develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous Resolutions, and outstanding issues ...

Mullah's money gave victory to Hamas

The swamp of middle east is getting deeper and deeper and the US dives into it faster and faster. If Iraq was not enough, if Hezbollah wasn't enough, if Benladen and Almosavi and Ahmadinejad weren't enough, now another beast has born in Palestine. The recent outcome of Palestinian election that Hamas won the most sits in the Palestinian parliament, make me think that what is going to happen to US plan for reforming the middle east for spreading democracy and how match western world is actually responsible for the plight of middle easteners?
I can't speak for other people , but as far as it goes to my homeland ,Iran, I can put the blame partly on western countries and their policy of appeasing the Iranian mulllahs. Believe it or not, but it is a fact that western policy makers during past 25 years have been caving in to Iranian regime's unending threat and demands in the expense of Iranian people and their resistance. They have been offering so called incentive after incentive to cool down the mullahs high temperature in the hope that this demon would change to an angle. They even mislead their own people just to appease the mullahs. Now the demon is out of Pandora box and a few step away from building atomic bomb. The oil mony and the waste resources of great country is in the hand of mullahs and they pay this mony to whomever support their fundamentalist anti-civilization agenda. It is Iranian regime's mony that feeds the Hamas charity organizations and propaganda machine and if it wasn't for that money and support, Hamas would never been able to sweep the election. During these years hundreds of thousands of Iranian have been executed and tortured under the blind eyes of western media, and instead of supporting the Iranian resistance, western countries added our resistance to their black terrorist list and opened red carpet for mullahs in their lands. They bombed the INLA in Iraq and disarm it to appease the mullahs. Now, they have become to a point that their own security is in danger and suddenly remembered that there is such thing as Iranian people. Bush sends message to us that he will stand with Iranian people. which Iranian people are you talking about Mr bush? How can we believe you when you and your allies call our just resistance terrorist and even now you are reluctant to remove the unjust terror tag from it? How?

poem/The glorious city

The glorious city

Dropping blood from his heart
He is standing straight and still
On the top of the highest hill
One hand aimed at the city
The other to the blue sky,
Where it meets the sea .

The river of time history
Running down the hill, in hurry
With so many marks from the past
And the years which are coming
The old city
- traveling from thousands of years-
is tired,
The remaining elements of victory are shining
And the shadows of pain are raving.

O’city, the glorious city!
O’home, the memorial home!
Where are your brave worriers?

O’statue, the old statue!
Who has been watching,
While history,
From the beginning to the end
You have seen everything
That has happened
Just tell me,
Tell me??
Where is the Worriers cemetery?
And where are their children?
Don’t they see!
The disgusting disaster
Falling down on the city!