Monday, February 20, 2017

Reasons for the Rise of Trumpism, Brexit, and, in General, the Rise of the Far Right G. B.Gaffari


G. B.Gaffari


           Despite the predictions of most pundits and polls in USA and Britain(1), Donald Trump and the Leave campaign in United Kingdom won the recent elections and the “Brexit” referendum respectively. These two important events have sent a strong shock wave throughout the word, and have compelled many pollsters, pundits, and political commentators to re- evaluate their understanding of social and political changes that had escaped their eyes previously. These, stealth but real, changes are generally caused by globalization and particularly eventuated from Obama's weak policies, which has created suitable ground for the rise of Islamic terrorism, has made many social groups, predominantly working and middle class whites, who are losing their privileges and feeling left behind, unsatisfied and angry. Even though the causes of rise of populist far-right groups and politicians in these two countries and other European countries differ slightly, It is obvious that there are some common reasons for both. These include economic problems, a sense of insecurity, the rise of nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-immigration sentiments that have lured  a considerable portion of the population into the arms of the radical ideas in several western countries. To sum up, it appears that globalization and the reactions to its negative consequences are the most important cause of the rise of radical right in the West. This phenomena has multiple aspects that could be simplified into three main categories, reactions to global economy, global culture, and global terrorism.
Reactions to Global Economy
        The global economy and subsequent international trade agreements and open border policies, have formed a universal interdependent economic system which has undermined the sovereignty of national governments and has allowed the multinational companies permission to search for cheaper labour markets overseas. As a result, many factories in industrial countries are closed, and the jobs have been exported to the other countries. For instance, the closure of factories in industrial midwest USA has left many communities without jobs nor futures.These ex-factory workers need extra training in order to work in the other sectors of the economy, and since they do not have that, they can not find decent jobs(2). Furthermore, they have to compete with immigrants, both documented and undocumented, for what lower-paying  jobs remain. In reaction to this situation, these workers are very angry at the establishment that has given away their jobs under the trade agreement treaties, and also at emigrants and refugees, who in their eyes, have taken their jobs away. This is one of the main causes for the rise of xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment in USA that is exploited by Trump. Another example is Britain, where millions of people from mainland Europe are working. Of course, those English citizens who have to compete for the same jobs with the people who they consider foreign and unwelcome, are unhappy. They are the ones who voted for the Leave campaign, the “Brexit”, in past summer’s referendum. Therefore, it is clear that reactions to globalization have created a convenient environment for the growth of “nativist populism(1)” and radical right in many western democracies.  
Reactions to Global Culture
           Because of the advancement of technologies such as computers, smart phones, the internet, and satellite communications, our planet is indeed in the path of becoming a real global village.This evolution in turn has created a global culture. Eventually, all national cultures and identities will be integrated to a new culture that will represent the whole humanity as one. In reaction to the emergence of this new cultural era, the more traditional elements of societies, fear that they might lose their identities and way of life. This fear in Islamic world has become a hotbed for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, and in western democracies, people who “feel culturally under threat from ethnic change”(1) are turning to extreme nationalism, anti establishment, anti refugee and in general anti-foreigner sentiments. Even though younger generations, who are more connected to each other by social media, have become more tolerant to the diverse ethnicity, older generations, who are nostalgic to sense of  greatness and of white cultural privileges, have become less tolerant to diversity. In the US election most white people over forty-five voted for Trump(3).  There is a similar voting demographic pattern in Brexit, with an absolute majority of white people over fifty-three voting for the Leave campaign(1). As the above examples indicate, the reaction to the global culture, and sentiments aroused from it, is another reason for the rise of far right political parties success in the West.
Global Terrorism
             On one hand, reactions to globalization in the Islamic world have resulted in the rise of fundamentalism and war in the Middle East, which subsequently has created a refugee crises in Europe(4). On the other hand, the weak policies of Obama and the rise of Iranian regime in the Middle East have created ISIS. ISIS terrorist attacks in USA and EU countries, to some extent have damaged the sense of public security. Since these attacks have been done under the name of Islam, the reaction of religious sectors of these societies has resulted in the rise of bigotry, and in particular Islamophobia. Also, because most of the refugees are coming from Islamic countries, fear of terrorist attacks and Islamophobia have turned a significant part of these societies against refugees.  Furthermore, these crises have reinforced existing xenophobic and racist sentiments among some voters. In the USA, these negative sentiments have been exploited by politicians like Trump. These strong feelings have helped Trump to mobilize the “alt right”, and must republican behind himself. In Britain and mainland Europe, the anti-refugee sentiments are also very high among voters. Far right parties in France, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Sweden(4)… etc are fostering and exploiting these sentiments to utilize their elevation in public opinion and maximize their vote share. Thus, global terrorism, and the refugee crisis arising from it, are another reason for the rise of far right in the West.  
              The rise of far right in western democracies, which Trump and Brexit supporters owe their victory to, is mostly rooted in the weak Obama foreign policies, and negative reaction of considerable portion of the white population in these countries toward globalization. These people see themselves at the losing end of drastic changes that had been eventuated by globalization. They see that the new interdependent global economy is taking away their jobs and is undermining the sovereignty of their national governments, that relatively open border policies changing the demography of their societies, that global culture is taking away their sense of cultural “greatness” and their way of life that they consider to be superior, and their sense of security has been diminished by global terrorism. They feel that they are losing control over their countries. As a result, anti immigrant sentiments and extreme nationalism are on the rise. These sentiments are fostered and exploited by far right politicians, and they have successfully positioned themselves as an alternative to the status quo and establishment. That is why they are able to mobilize these discontented voters behind themselves.  


1) Goodwin, Matthew. “Why Trump could still pull off a surprise?”.
Politico Magazine, October 16, 2016
(2) Korybko, Andrew. ”Here’s Why Donald Trump Won In America’s Midwestern “Rust Belt”.
            Global Research, 11 November,2016

(3) “Reality Check: Who voted for Donald Trump?”

BBC.com,9 November 2016.

http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37922587

(4) Bremmer, Ian. “These 5 Facts Explain the Worrying Rise of Europe’s Far-Right”.
Time.com, Oct. 15, 2015


p Could Still Pull Off a

Sunday, February 19, 2017

Why left is less concern than right for the human rights abroad

Sweden’s social democrat prime minister, Stefan Löfven, is visiting Iranian regime’s officials in Iran and shaking their bloody hands. There is no need to say that, this regime is the main sponsor of international terrorism and also been under United -Nations investigation for violation of human rights and horrible oppression of Iranian women for decades. It seems the more progressive or leftist Western politicians are, the less concern they are for the violations of human rights and oppression of women by regimes such as Iranian regime and other Muslim fundamentalists. Naturally, we may expect that someone with more progressive political/social views be more sensitive and tougher in dealing with violators or human rights and oppressors of women. But in Western democracies, it is reverse, and in reality, it is the right, which supposedly is not as progressive as left when it goes to political/ social issues, that is more sensitive and tougher when it goes to dealing with the fundamentalists. It is not only Sweden left that appeases the Muslim fundamentalism, but also there is the same pattern in countries like Canada and USA. For example, prime minster Trudeau (a liberal) is much more cozying with Iranian regime than Harper (a conservative) did. Also, Trump seems much more tougher than Obama. Why is it so? Is that because they don’t consider the people who are oppressed by fundamentalists as human as themselves, therefore, they don’t view them with the same standard that they view their own people?  Is that because they have sympathy for fundamentalist, or perhaps, the greed and the economic deals have made them blind? Or maybe, they are just hypocrites and don’t believe in what they claim? Or, Is it the lack of principal? Whatever reason it is, it is really shameful.

Tuesday, March 06, 2012

Another victory for Iranian resistance

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/6/embassy-row-court-backs-iranians/?page=all#pagebreak
The Iranian resistance won another victory in a U.S. federal court this week, when a three-judge panel ruled the group has a right to a speedy hearing on its petition to be removed from the U.S. terrorist list - after nearly two years of delay by the State Department.

Monday, August 22, 2011

NDP leader passed away, Jack Layton's last letter to Canadians


My friends, love is better than anger. Hope is better than fear. Optimism is better than despair. So let us be loving, hopeful and optimistic. And we’ll change the world.




August 20, 2011

Toronto, Ontario


Dear Friends,

Tens of thousands of Canadians have written to me in recent weeks to wish me well. I want to thank each and every one of you for your thoughtful, inspiring and often beautiful notes, cards and gifts. Your spirit and love have lit up my home, my spirit, and my determination.

Unfortunately my treatment has not worked out as I hoped. So I am giving this letter to my partner Olivia to share with you in the circumstance in which I cannot continue.

I recommend that Hull-Aylmer MP Nycole Turmel continue her work as our interim leader until a permanent successor is elected.

I recommend the party hold a leadership vote as early as possible in the New Year, on approximately the same timelines as in 2003, so that our new leader has ample time to reconsolidate our team, renew our party and our program, and move forward towards the next election.

A few additional thoughts:

To other Canadians who are on journeys to defeat cancer and to live their lives, I say this: please don’t be discouraged that my own journey hasn’t gone as well as I had hoped. You must not lose your own hope. Treatments and therapies have never been better in the face of this disease. You have every reason to be optimistic, determined, and focused on the future. My only other advice is to cherish every moment with those you love at every stage of your journey, as I have done this summer.

To the members of my party: we’ve done remarkable things together in the past eight years. It has been a privilege to lead the New Democratic Party and I am most grateful for your confidence, your support, and the endless hours of volunteer commitment you have devoted to our cause. There will be those who will try to persuade you to give up our cause. But that cause is much bigger than any one leader. Answer them by recommitting with energy and determination to our work. Remember our proud history of social justice, universal health care, public pensions and making sure no one is left behind. Let’s continue to move forward. Let’s demonstrate in everything we do in the four years before us that we are ready to serve our beloved Canada as its next government.

To the members of our parliamentary caucus: I have been privileged to work with each and every one of you. Our caucus meetings were always the highlight of my week. It has been my role to ask a great deal from you. And now I am going to do so again. Canadians will be closely watching you in the months to come. Colleagues, I know you will make the tens of thousands of members of our party proud of you by demonstrating the same seamless teamwork and solidarity that has earned us the confidence of millions of Canadians in the recent election.

To my fellow Quebecers: On May 2nd, you made an historic decision. You decided that the way to replace Canada’s Conservative federal government with something better was by working together in partnership with progressive-minded Canadians across the country. You made the right decision then; it is still the right decision today; and it will be the right decision right through to the next election, when we will succeed, together. You have elected a superb team of New Democrats to Parliament. They are going to be doing remarkable things in the years to come to make this country better for us all.

To young Canadians: All my life I have worked to make things better. Hope and optimism have defined my political career, and I continue to be hopeful and optimistic about Canada. Young people have been a great source of inspiration for me. I have met and talked with so many of you about your dreams, your frustrations, and your ideas for change. More and more, you are engaging in politics because you want to change things for the better. Many of you have placed your trust in our party. As my time in political life draws to a close I want to share with you my belief in your power to change this country and this world. There are great challenges before you, from the overwhelming nature of climate change to the unfairness of an economy that excludes so many from our collective wealth, and the changes necessary to build a more inclusive and generous Canada. I believe in you. Your energy, your vision, your passion for justice are exactly what this country needs today. You need to be at the heart of our economy, our political life, and our plans for the present and the future.

And finally, to all Canadians: Canada is a great country, one of the hopes of the world. We can be a better one – a country of greater equality, justice, and opportunity. We can build a prosperous economy and a society that shares its benefits more fairly. We can look after our seniors. We can offer better futures for our children. We can do our part to save the world’s environment. We can restore our good name in the world. We can do all of these things because we finally have a party system at the national level where there are real choices; where your vote matters; where working for change can actually bring about change. In the months and years to come, New Democrats will put a compelling new alternative to you. My colleagues in our party are an impressive, committed team. Give them a careful hearing; consider the alternatives; and consider that we can be a better, fairer, more equal country by working together. Don’t let them tell you it can’t be done.

My friends, love is better than anger. Hope is better than fear. Optimism is better than despair. So let us be loving, hopeful and optimistic. And we’ll change the world.

All my very best,

Jack Layton

Wednesday, June 08, 2011

The Telegraph-Mir-Hossein Mousavi 'involved in massacre', says report

Mir-Hossein Mousavi 'involved in massacre', says report

Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the leader of Iran's opposition green movement was involved in the massacre of more than 10,000 political prisoners in 1988, according to a report.

Mir-Hossein Mousavi 'involved in massacre', says report
Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Iran opposition leader Photo: REUTERS

Mr Mousavi, the defeated candidate in last June's presidential election, served as Iran's prime minister when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the regime's spiritual leader, issued a fatwa that sentenced thousands of political prisoners to death without trial, according to the report by one of Britain's leading human rights lawyers.

Mr Mousavi is one of several prominent Iranian politicians who are accused of implementing the order. According to a detailed report published by Geoffrey Robertson QC, who specialises in human rights law, the prisoners were executed for refusing to recant their political and religious beliefs.

"They were hung from cranes, four at a time, or in groups of six from ropes hanging from the stage of the prison assembly hall," the report states. "Their bodies were doused with disinfectant, packed in refrigerated trucks, and buried by night in mass graves."

Mr Robertson compares the mass executions in Iran with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre during the Bosnian civil war, in which an estimated 8,000 people died.

He is now calling on the UN Security Council to set up a special court to try those responsible "for one of the worst single human rights atrocities since the Second World War".

Apart from Mr Mousavi, the report accuses other prominent members of the Iranian regime, such as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's current Supreme Leader, and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, of being involved in the mass executions, which took place following the end of Iran's eight-year war with Iraq.

"There is no doubt they have a case to answer," said Mr Robertson, who has served as an appeal judge for the UN and was asked to investigate the mass executions by the Washington-based Boroumand Foundation, a human rights organisation funded by Iranian exiles. "There is a prima facie case for their complicity in mass murder."

In an interview given to Austrian television in December 1988, Mr Mousavi tried to defend the mass executions of the prisoners, many of whom were members of the Marxist "Mojahedin Khalq" organisation, which opposed the Islamic regime established by Khomeini following the 1979 Iranian revolution.

"We had to crush the conspiracy," said Mr Mousavi. "In that respect we have no mercy."

Many of those executed had already served their prison sentences and been released, but were recalled to prison on Khomeini's orders and executed. Women who were suspected of opposing the regime were ordered to be whipped five times a day until they agreed to accept the Islamic revolution "or else died from the lash", the report states.

Publication of the report is deeply embarrassing for Mr Mousavi, who has tried to position himself as a moderate who is opposed to the hardline policies of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

But critics claim his past involvement with the regime should disqualify him from membership of Iran's green movement, which is campaigning for greater freedom and democracy in Iran.

Sunday, March 09, 2008

UNSC's 1803 resolution on Iran

United Nations S/RES/1803 (2008)
Security Council
Distr.: General
3 March 2008
08-25781 (E)
*0825781*
Resolution 1803 (2008)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5848th meeting,
on 3 March 2008
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,
and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of
23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and
reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and
II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),
which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007
(GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007
(GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and
sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy
water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747
(2007), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol,
nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied
with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and
1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s
refusal to take these steps,
Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify
design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified
Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the
Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right,
S/RES/1803 (2008)
2 08-25781
which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear
material at, a facility,
Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly
supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commending the IAEA for its
efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the
work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48,
Attachment), welcoming the progress in implementation of this work plan as
reflected in the IAEA Director General’s reports of 15 November 2007
(GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), underlining the importance
of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing
implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the
questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the
required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of
Iran’s declaration,
Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes,
Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on
exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through
negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and noting the
confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international
community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is
restored, it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon
State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to
assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737
(2006),
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006),
resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain
Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile
programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives
of these resolutions have been met,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of
Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of
its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by
the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to
S/RES/1803 (2008)
08-25781 3
build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and
to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran
shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006),
and underlines that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1
modified;
2. Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all
outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this
regard as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008
(GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding
issues, stresses that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports the IAEA in
strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the
Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;
3. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and
decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant
to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry
into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to
resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this
resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the
Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for
Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the
prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and
under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where
such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs
3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);
4. Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse
its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the
implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the
objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007),
including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
5. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to
this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or
the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support
for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the
prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and
under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where
such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs
3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this
paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
6. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply
where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified
S/RES/1803 (2008)
4 08-25781
on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the
Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of
the present resolution;
7. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I
and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their
direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities
determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or
entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution,
resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);
8. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their
nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran,
and whether or not originating in their territories, of:
(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or
transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737
(2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1
and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to
the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such
supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the
IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737
(2006);
(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3
of Category II of document S/2006/815;
9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new
commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the
granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities
involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);
10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with
Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order
to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities,
or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in
resolution 1737 (2006);
11. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities
and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea
and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and
from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated
by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods
prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);
12. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph
above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a
S/RES/1803 (2008)
08-25781 5
written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds
for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results
and other relevant details;
13. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;
14. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747
(2007) and this resolution;
15. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic
efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their
offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution
of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and
wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as
Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA;
16. Encourages the European Union High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of
political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant
proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;
17. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the
necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the
Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities
designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person
claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with
any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of
the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or
resolution 1747 (2007);
18. Requests within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the
IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other
provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution,
to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its
consideration;
19. Reaffirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred
to in the paragraph above, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as
Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in
order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
S/RES/1803 (2008)
6 08-25781
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as
it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that
Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the
Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as
confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied
with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and
this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these
resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions
will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex I
1. Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of
centrifuges)
2. Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl
carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
3. Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and
Mining Affairs)
4. Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of
99.9%)
5. Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)
6. Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research
Institute)
7. Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research
reactor project at Arak)
8. M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated
under resolution 1747 (2007))
9. Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium
Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)
10. Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed
Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-
Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions
imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))
11. Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment
complex)
12. Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
13. Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand
Uranium Mine)
S/RES/1803 (2008)
08-25781 7
Annex II
A. Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)
1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
3. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)
B. Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)
1. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
2. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center,
which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement
Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
Annex III
1. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge
components)
2. Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System
companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed
in resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved
in the ballistic missile programme)
4. Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
5. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation
Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)
6. Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
7. Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
8. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries
Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of
centrifuges components)
9. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to
manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)
10. Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the
Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
11. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the
ballistic missile programme)
12. TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the
overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established,
including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of
uranium processing, enrichment and waste)

Tuesday, December 04, 2007

Iran:Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, nov.2007

Iran: Nuclear Intentions and
Capabilities
November 2007
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community
(IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program
and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is charged with:
• Integrating the domestic and foreign dimensions of US intelligence so that there are
no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security;
• Bringing more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and
• Ensuring that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as present
results.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
Since its formation in 1973, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has served as a
bridge between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive
expertise on critical national security issues, and as a focal point for Intelligence
Community collaboration. The NIC's key goal is to provide policymakers with the best,
unvarnished, and unbiased information—regardless of whether analytic judgments
conform to US policy. Its primary functions are to:
• Support the DNI in his role as Principal Intelligence Advisor to the President and
other senior policymakers.
• Lead the Intelligence Community's effort to produce National Intelligence Estimates
(NIEs) and other NIC products that address key national security concerns.
• Provide a focal point for policymakers, warfighters, and Congressional leaders to task
the Intelligence Community for answers to important questions.
• Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector—and use
alternative analyses and new analytic tools—to broaden and deepen the Intelligence
Community's perspective.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND THE NIE PROCESS
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most
authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US
civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.
NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily
“estimative”—that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and
identify the implications for US policy.
The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers,
Congressional leaders and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council
(NIC). Before a NIE is drafted, the relevant NIO is responsible for producing a concept
paper or terms of reference (TOR) and circulates it throughout the Intelligence
Community for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions, determines
drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. One or more IC
analysts are usually assigned to produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to critique
the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the relevant IC
agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE. Working with
their Agencies, reps also assign the level of confidence they have in each key judgment.
IC reps discuss the quality of sources with collectors, and the National Clandestine
Service vets the sources used to ensure the draft does not include any that have been
recalled or otherwise seriously questioned.
All NIEs are reviewed by National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI and is
composed of the heads of relevant IC agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are
briefed to the President and senior policymakers. The whole process of producing NIEs
normally takes at least several months.
The NIC has undertaken a number of steps to improve the NIE process under the DNI.
These steps are in accordance with the goals and recommendations set out in the SSCI
and WMD Commission reports and the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Prevention of
Terrorism Act. Most notably, over the last year and a half, the IC has:
• Created new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and
technical judgments. The Directors of the National Clandestine Service, NSA, NGA,
and DIA and the Assistant Secretary/INR are now required to submit formal
assessments that highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and overall credibility of their
sources used in developing the critical judgments of the NIE.
• Applied more rigorous standards. A textbox is incorporated into all NIEs that
explains what we mean by such terms as “we judge” and that clarifies the difference
between judgments of likelihood and confidence levels. We have made a concerted
effort to not only highlight differences among agencies but to explain the reasons for
such differences and to prominently display them in the Key Judgments.
S c o p e N o t e
This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assesses the status of Iran’s nuclear program, and the
program’s outlook over the next 10 years. This time frame is more appropriate for estimating
capabilities than intentions and foreign reactions, which are more difficult to estimate over a
decade. In presenting the Intelligence Community’s assessment of Iranian nuclear intentions and
capabilities, the NIE thoroughly reviews all available information on these questions, examines
the range of reasonable scenarios consistent with this information, and describes the key factors
we judge would drive or impede nuclear progress in Iran. This NIE is an extensive
reexamination of the issues in the May 2005 assessment.
This Estimate focuses on the following key questions:
• What are Iran’s intentions toward developing nuclear weapons?
• What domestic factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?
• What external factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?
• What is the range of potential Iranian actions concerning the development of nuclear
weapons, and the decisive factors that would lead Iran to choose one course of action over
another?
• What is Iran’s current and projected capability to develop nuclear weapons? What are our
key assumptions, and Iran’s key chokepoints/vulnerabilities?
This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, it
examines the intelligence to assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire
nuclear weapons, taking full account of Iran’s dual-use uranium fuel cycle and those
nuclear activities that are at least partly civil in nature.
This Estimate does assume that the strategic goals and basic structure of Iran’s senior leadership
and government will remain similar to those that have endured since the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1989. We acknowledge the potential for these to change during the time frame of
the Estimate, but are unable to confidently predict such changes or their implications. This
Estimate does not assess how Iran may conduct future negotiations with the West on the nuclear
issue.
This Estimate incorporates intelligence reporting available as of 31 October 2007.
What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language
We use phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimate—and probabilistic terms such as
probably and likely—to convey analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are not
facts, proof, or knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on collected
information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on previous
judgments. In all cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have
“proof” that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.
In addition to conveying judgments rather than certainty, our estimative language also often
conveys 1) our assessed likelihood or probability of an event; and 2) the level of confidence we
ascribe to the judgment.
Estimates of Likelihood. Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic
language to reflect the Community’s estimates of the likelihood of developments or events.
Terms such as probably, likely, very likely, or almost certainly indicate a greater than even
chance. The terms unlikely and remote indicate a less then even chance that an event will occur;
they do not imply that an event will not occur. Terms such as might or may reflect situations in
which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally because relevant information is
unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as we cannot dismiss, we cannot rule out, or we
cannot discount reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose consequences are such
that it warrants mentioning. The chart provides a rough idea of the relationship of some of these
terms to each other.
Remote Very Even Probably/ Very Almost
unlikely Unlikely chance Likely likely certainly
Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that
varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of
confidence to our assessments, as follows:
• High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality
information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment.
A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still
carry a risk of being wrong.
• Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible
but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of
confidence.
• Low confidence generally means that the information’s credibility and/or plausibility is
questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid
analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.
Key Judgments
A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
undeclared nuclear work.
• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged
previously.
B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would
need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge
with high confidence it has not yet done.
C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough
fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge
1 For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design
and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we
do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.
enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons
program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating
them.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be
technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
(INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing
to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its
options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt
it to restart the program.
• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived
by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
is inherently reversible.
F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—
rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium
conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been
restarted through at least mid-2007.
G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
Key Differences Between the Key Judgments of This Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear
Program and the May 2005 Assessment
2005 IC Estimate 2007 National Intelligence Estimate
Assess with high confidence that Iran
currently is determined to develop nuclear
weapons despite its international
obligations and international pressure, but
we do not assess that Iran is immovable.
Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,
Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge
with high confidence that the halt lasted at least
several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate
confidence that the halt to those activities
represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons
program.) Assess with moderate confidence
Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know
whether it currently intends to develop nuclear
weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt
was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from
exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear
work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence
that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the
option to develop nuclear weapons.
We have moderate confidence in projecting
when Iran is likely to make a nuclear
weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before
early-to-mid next decade.
We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate
confidence Iran probably would be technically
capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR
judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this
capability before 2013 because of foreseeable
technical and programmatic problems.)
Iran could produce enough fissile material
for a weapon by the end of this decade if it
were to make more rapid and successful
progress than we have seen to date.
We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely.

Saturday, November 24, 2007

IAEA's report on iran, nov 15,2007

Board of Governors GOV/2007/58
Date: 15 November 2007
Restricted Distribution
Original: English
For official use only
Item 3(c) of the revised provisional agenda
(GOV/2007/60/Rev.1)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747
(2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 30 August 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/48 and
Corr.1). This report covers the relevant developments since that date.
A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues
2. On 21 August 2007, the Secretariat and Iran reached understandings on a work plan for
resolving outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment). Since the
previous report, the following progress has been made in the implementation of the work plan.
A.1. P-1 and P-2 Centrifuges
3. The chronology of activities since the previous report is as follows:
xOn 31 August 2007, the Agency provided to Iran in writing the outstanding questions
relating to the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme;
xOn 24 and 25 September 2007, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and
Iranian officials to clarify the questions provided to Iran;
xFrom 9 to 11 October 2007, another meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and
the Iranian authorities, at which Iran provided oral answers to the questions and the Agency
requested additional clarifications and amplifications;.GOV/2007/58
Page 2
xOn 15 October 2007, the Agency received preliminary written answers to the questions;
xFrom 20 to 24 October 2007, an Agency technical team visited Tehran to review in detail the
answers and supporting documentation, and to interview officials involved in the P-1 and P-2
uranium enrichment programme;
xFrom 29 October to 1 November 2007, the Agency continued discussions with the Iranian
authorities on the centrifuge enrichment programme. Iran provided additional supporting
documentation and written amplifications and the Agency held discussions and interviews
with Iranian officials involved in nuclear activities in the 1980s and 1990s;
xOn 5 and 12 November 2007, Iran provided in writing its response to the Agency’s questions
about the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme.
A.1.1. Acquisition of Fuel Cycle Facilities and Technology 1972–1995
4. According to Iran, in its early years, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) concluded
a number of contracts with entities from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
of America to enable it to acquire nuclear power and a wide range of related nuclear fuel cycle
services, but after the 1979 revolution, these contracts with a total value of around $10 billion were not
fulfilled. Iran noted that one of the contracts, signed in 1976, was for the development of a pilot plant
for laser enrichment
1
. Senior Iranian officials said that, in the mid-1980s, Iran started working with
many countries to revitalize its nuclear programme to meet the State’s growing energy needs. Taking
advantage of investments already made, Iran said it focused its efforts initially on the completion of
the Bushehr nuclear power plant, working with entities from, inter alia, Argentina, France, Germany
and Spain, but without success. At that time, Iran also initiated efforts to acquire research reactors
from Argentina, China, India and the former Soviet Union, but also without success.
5. Parallel to the activities related to nuclear power plants, Iran started to build supporting
infrastructure by establishing nuclear technology centres in Esfahan and Karaj. However, apart from
uranium conversion technology acquired from an entity in China, Iran was not able to acquire other
nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technology from abroad. As a result, according to Iran, a decision was
made in the mid-1980s to acquire uranium enrichment technology on the black market.
6. To assess the detailed information provided by Iran, the Agency held discussions with senior
current and former Iranian officials. The Agency also examined supporting documentation, including
Iranian legislation, contracts with foreign companies, agreements with other States and nuclear site
surveys.
7. Bearing in mind the long history and complexity of the programme and the dual nature of
enrichment technology, the Agency is not in a position, based on the information currently available to
it, to draw conclusions about the original underlying nature of parts of the programme. Further light
may be shed on this question when other aspects of the work plan have been addressed and when the
Agency has been able to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
__________________________________________________________________________________ 1
In addition to the 1976 contract for the laser enrichment pilot plant, concluded with a US company, Iran has reported the conclusion of the
following contracts related to laser enrichment (GOV/2004/60, Annex, para. 30):
•1975 – for the establishment of a laboratory to study the spectroscopic behaviour of uranium metal (Germany);
•1991 – for the establishment of a Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory and a Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (China);
•1998 – to obtain information related to laser enrichment, and the supply of relevant equipment (Russian Federation)..GOV/2007/58
Page 3
A.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 Centrifuge Technology
The 1987 Offer
8. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2005/67, paras 14–15), the Agency was shown by
Iran in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer for certain
components and equipment said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. Iran
stated in 2005 that this was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and
content of the 1987 offer. On 9 October 2007, the Agency was provided with a copy of the document.
Certain aspects of the document indicate that it dates from 1987. However, the originator of the
document has still not been identified.
9. On 5 November 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of meetings
between Iran and the supply network covering the period 1986 to 1987. Iran maintains that only some
components of two disassembled centrifuges, plus supporting drawings and specifications, were
delivered in 1987 by the network. Iran reiterated that it did not acquire uranium casting and re-
conversion technology or equipment from the network, nor did it ask for the 15-page document
describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal, and its casting into hemispheres
(GOV/2005/87, para. 6). These points are addressed in A.3 below.
10. According to Iran, the decision to acquire centrifuge technology was taken by the President of
the AEOI and endorsed by the Prime Minister of Iran. In response to its enquiries about possible
additional documentation relevant to the 1987 offer, the Agency was provided on 8 November 2007
with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to the Prime Minister,
dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister’s endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In
his communication, the AEOI President indicated that the activities "should be treated fully
confidentially." In response to the Agency’s enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement
in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision-
making process or in the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.
11. Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, limited
documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected through the Agency’s
independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements are consistent with other
information available to the Agency concerning Iran’s acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge
enrichment technology in 1987.
Early Research and Development
12. Iran has stated that, during the first phase of P-1 research and development (R&D) in 1987–
1993, it devoted only limited financial and human resources (three researchers) to the project.
According to Iran, emphasis was put on understanding the behaviour of centrifuges and their assembly
and on domestic production of components. Iran has also stated that during this period, the R&D work
was conducted only by the AEOI, without the support of universities or the Physics Research Centre
(PHRC). According to Iran, no contacts were made during this period with the supply network to seek
support in solving technical problems which Iran had encountered.
13. Iran’s statements about this phase of R&D are not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings,
which are based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network,
supporting documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected during the
Agency’s investigations. However, the role of the technical university at which uranium particle
contamination was found still needs to be examined (see A.2 below)..GOV/2007/58
Page 4
The 1993 Offer and Subsequent R&D
14. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2006/15, para. 15), statements made by Iran and key
members of the supply network about the events leading up to the mid-1990s offer have been at
variance with each other. Over the course of meetings held in October 2007, Iran provided the Agency
with an updated chronology of events from 1993 to 1999 which clarified certain details concerning
meetings, participants and deliveries of P-1 centrifuge equipment by the network during this period.
15. Iran stated again that in 1993 the supply network, on its own initiative, had approached an
Iranian company with an offer to sell enrichment technology. This offer was brought to the attention
of the Head of Iran’s Budget and Planning Organization, who was also a member of the country’s
Atomic Energy Council. The offer was then further pursued by the AEOI (GOV/2005/67, para. 16).
16. The Agency has so far not been able to confirm Iran’s statement that the supply network
initiated the 1993 offer. Information provided by Iran on the deliveries and technical meetings after
1993 is consistent with that given to the Agency in interviews with some of the network members.
Based on interviews with Libyan officials and supply network members and information from other
sources, the Agency has concluded that most of the items related to the 1993 offer had originally been
ordered by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya but were in fact delivered to Iran in the period 1994–1996.
17. Iran stated that, during the period 1993 to 1999, it was still experiencing difficulty in producing
components for P-1 centrifuges and manufacturing reliable P-1 centrifuges. It said that only limited
human resources were devoted to the project until 1997 and that, around 1998, additional theoretical
and experimental studies were initiated at the Amir Khabir University. Its statements in this regard are
supported by the technical questions raised by AEOI staff with the network and procurement
information available to the Agency.
18. Iran stated that it successfully tested P-1 centrifuges at the end of the 1990s and that a decision
was made to go ahead with larger-scale R&D and eventually with an enrichment plant. To that end,
Iran stated that it considered locations at Hashtgerd Karaj, Natanz and Esfahan before deciding to
build the enrichment plant at Natanz. During this period, procurement activities were intensified and
vacuum equipment, as well as special raw materials such as maraging steel and high strength
aluminium, were acquired from abroad. Iran has provided names, locations and activities of the
workshops involved in the domestic production of centrifuge components, most of which are owned
by military industrial organizations (GOV/2004/11, para. 37). Information provided by Iran on the
timing of these purchases and the quantities involved is consistent with the Agency’s findings.
A.1.3. Acquisition of P-2 Centrifuge Technology
19. Iran has stated that, in order to compensate it for the poor quality of the P-1 centrifuge
components provided by the supply network, the network provided Iran at a meeting in Dubai in 1996
with a full set of general P-2 centrifuge drawings. This statement was confirmed to the Agency in
interviews with key members of the network.
20. Iran has reiterated that, although the drawings were acquired in 1996, no work on P-2
centrifuges was begun until 2002. According to the former and current senior management of the
AEOI, Iran did not yet have the technical and scientific capabilities to master centrifuge
manufacturing during this period. The Agency does not have credible procurement related information
pointing to the actual acquisition by Iran of P-2 centrifuges or components during this period (an
earlier indication which appeared to support this (GOV/2006/15, para. 18) could not be substantiated)..GOV/2007/58
Page 5
21. In 2002, the AEOI concluded a contract with a private company to manufacture a modified P-2
centrifuge (GOV/2004/11, para. 45). On 5 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the
contract, the content of which is consistent with earlier interviews with the company owner, who was
not available for interview on this occasion. The contract was terminated in March 2003, but the
company owner has stated that he continued to work "on his own initiative" until June 2003.
22. The owner of the company stated in earlier interviews that he was able to obtain all raw
materials and minor items, with the exception of bearings, oils and magnets, from domestic sources,
which is consistent with the procurement information currently available to the Agency. The owner
stated that he acquired 150 magnets with P-2 specifications and attempted to buy tens of thousands
more, but these orders were cancelled by the suppliers. The AEOI stated that, after termination of his
contract with the AEOI, the company owner sought to secure the supply of additional magnets for the
AEOI but that his attempts to do so failed, which is consistent with the information available to the
Agency through its investigations. Iran acknowledged that composite rotors for P-2 centrifuges had
been manufactured in a workshop situated on a Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) site
(GOV/2004/34, para. 22).
23. Based on visits made by Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshop in 2004, examination of the
company owner’s contract, progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement
enquiries, the Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D
activities are consistent with the Agency’s findings. Environmental samples taken at declared R&D
locations and from equipment did not indicate that nuclear material was used in these experiments.
A.2. Source of Contamination
24. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions in writing in connection with
the source of uranium particle contamination at the technical university and requested access to
relevant documentation and to individuals, as well as to relevant equipment and locations for sample-
taking. The questions were, inter alia, about the origin of the uranium particle contamination of
equipment (GOV/2006/53, para. 24), the nature of the equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment
and the names and roles of individuals and entities involved (including PHRC). In accordance with the
work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few
weeks.
A.3. Uranium Metal Document
25. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the 15-page document describing the
procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres. Iran has
reiterated that this document was received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987. The
Agency has shared this document with Pakistan, the purported country of origin, and is seeking more
information. Iran stated that the reconversion unit with casting equipment mentioned in the one-page
1987 offer was not pursued with the supply network. Apart from the conversion experiments of UF4 to
uranium metal at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (GOV/2004/60 Annex, para. 2), the Agency has
seen no indication of any UF6 reconversion and casting activity in Iran. It should be noted, however,
that a small UF6 to uranium metal conversion line in the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was
declared by Iran in the design information questionnaire for the UCF (GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, para.
3). This line has not been built, as verified by the Agency’s inspectors.
A.4. Polonium-210
26. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning Iran’s
activities involving polonium and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and.GOV/2007/58
Page 6
equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the scope and objectives of the polonium-210 studies
(GOV/2004/11, para. 28), whether any bismuth acquisitions from abroad had been made or attempted
and whether any related theoretical or R&D studies had been carried out in Iran. In accordance with
the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few
weeks.
A.5. Gchine Mine
27. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning the Gchine
Mine and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and equipment. The questions were,
inter alia, about the ownership of the mining area and mill, why activities took place at this location
when suitable infrastructure was available elsewhere and why AEOI activities at the mine ceased
around 1993 (GOV/2005/67, para. 26). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers
to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.
A.6. Alleged Studies
28. The Agency has urged Iran to address at an early date the alleged studies concerning the
conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (the green salt project), high explosive testing and the design
of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/15, paras 38–39). In accordance with the work plan, Iran
should address this topic in the next few weeks. In the meantime, the Agency is working on
arrangements for sharing with Iran documents provided by third parties related to the alleged studies.
A.7. Facility Attachment for the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
29. On 17 and 18 September 2007, an Agency technical team discussed with the Iranian authorities
details of a draft Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. Further
discussions from 20 to 24 September led to the entry into force of the Facility Attachment on
30 September 2007.
B. Current Enrichment Related Activities
30. On 3 November 2007, the Agency verified that Iran had finished installing eighteen 164-
machine cascades at FEP and that UF6 had been fed into all 18 cascades. There has been no
installation of centrifuges or centrifuge pipework outside the original 18-cascade area. Work to install
feed and withdrawal infrastructure and auxiliary systems is continuing.
31. Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 1240 kg of UF6 into the cascades at FEP. The
feed rate has remained below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While Iran has stated
that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, the highest U-235 enrichment
measured so far from the environmental samples taken by the Agency from cascade components and
related equipment is 4.0%. Detailed nuclear material accountancy will be carried out during the annual
physical inventory taking which is scheduled from 16 to 19 December 2007. Since March 2007, a total
of seven unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP.
32. Since August 2007, Iran has continued to test single centrifuge machines, the 10- and 20-
machine cascades and one 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between
23 July and 22 October 2007, Iran fed 5 kg of UF6 into the single machines; no nuclear material was.GOV/2007/58
Page 7
fed into the cascades. From 15 to 18 September 2007, the Agency performed a physical inventory
verification at PFEP. Although some of the sample results are not yet available, the Agency’s
provisional evaluation tends to confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran.
33. There have been several press reports about statements by high level Iranian officials
concerning R&D and testing of P-2 centrifuges by Iran (GOV/2006/27, para. 14). In a communication
to the Agency received on 8 November 2007, Iran wrote: "Iran voluntarily has informed the IAEA on
the status of mechanical test (without UF6 feeding) of new generation of centrifuge design." In the
communication, Iran added that it "agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation
information" would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007.
C. Reprocessing Activities
34. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the
MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design
information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at
those facilities.
D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
35. On 11 November 2007, the Agency conducted design information verification at the IR-40 and
noted that construction of the facility was proceeding. Satellite imagery appears to indicate that the
Heavy Water Production Plant is operating. The Agency must rely on satellite imagery of this plant as
it does not have routine access to it while the Additional Protocol remains unimplemented.
E. Other Implementation Issues
E.1. Uranium Conversion
36. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007,
approximately 78 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced as of 5 November 2007.
This brings the total amount of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to approximately 266 tonnes,
all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance..GOV/2007/58
Page 8
E.2. Design Information
37. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the
implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1.
(GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14)
2
, but there has been no progress on this issue.
E.3. Other Matters
38. The Agency has made arrangements to verify and seal the fresh fuel foreseen for the Bushehr
nuclear power plant on 26 November 2007, before shipment of the fuel from the Russian Federation
to Iran.
F. Summary
39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran
has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required
nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran
concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the
Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to
the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about
Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.
40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction
of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.
41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme: Iran’s past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The
Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge
programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek
corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations. The Agency intends
in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other
activities that could have military applications.
42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to
questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work
plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran’s
active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the
work plan.
43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present
programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that
the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally
__________________________________________________________________________________
2
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part as agreed to in 1976 provides for the submission of design information for new
facilities "normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time", in contrast to the
modified text agreed to in 2003, which provides for the submission of such information as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize
construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier..GOV/2007/58
Page 9
importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the
Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible
current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide
credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full
implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran’s
undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively
peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to
implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to
implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the
suspension of all enrichment related activities.
44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.