Iran: Nuclear Intentions and
Capabilities
November 2007
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community
(IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program
and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is charged with:
• Integrating the domestic and foreign dimensions of US intelligence so that there are
no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security;
• Bringing more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and
• Ensuring that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as present
results.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
Since its formation in 1973, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has served as a
bridge between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive
expertise on critical national security issues, and as a focal point for Intelligence
Community collaboration. The NIC's key goal is to provide policymakers with the best,
unvarnished, and unbiased information—regardless of whether analytic judgments
conform to US policy. Its primary functions are to:
• Support the DNI in his role as Principal Intelligence Advisor to the President and
other senior policymakers.
• Lead the Intelligence Community's effort to produce National Intelligence Estimates
(NIEs) and other NIC products that address key national security concerns.
• Provide a focal point for policymakers, warfighters, and Congressional leaders to task
the Intelligence Community for answers to important questions.
• Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector—and use
alternative analyses and new analytic tools—to broaden and deepen the Intelligence
Community's perspective.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND THE NIE PROCESS
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most
authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US
civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.
NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily
“estimative”—that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and
identify the implications for US policy.
The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers,
Congressional leaders and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council
(NIC). Before a NIE is drafted, the relevant NIO is responsible for producing a concept
paper or terms of reference (TOR) and circulates it throughout the Intelligence
Community for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions, determines
drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. One or more IC
analysts are usually assigned to produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to critique
the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the relevant IC
agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE. Working with
their Agencies, reps also assign the level of confidence they have in each key judgment.
IC reps discuss the quality of sources with collectors, and the National Clandestine
Service vets the sources used to ensure the draft does not include any that have been
recalled or otherwise seriously questioned.
All NIEs are reviewed by National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI and is
composed of the heads of relevant IC agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are
briefed to the President and senior policymakers. The whole process of producing NIEs
normally takes at least several months.
The NIC has undertaken a number of steps to improve the NIE process under the DNI.
These steps are in accordance with the goals and recommendations set out in the SSCI
and WMD Commission reports and the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Prevention of
Terrorism Act. Most notably, over the last year and a half, the IC has:
• Created new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and
technical judgments. The Directors of the National Clandestine Service, NSA, NGA,
and DIA and the Assistant Secretary/INR are now required to submit formal
assessments that highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and overall credibility of their
sources used in developing the critical judgments of the NIE.
• Applied more rigorous standards. A textbox is incorporated into all NIEs that
explains what we mean by such terms as “we judge” and that clarifies the difference
between judgments of likelihood and confidence levels. We have made a concerted
effort to not only highlight differences among agencies but to explain the reasons for
such differences and to prominently display them in the Key Judgments.
S c o p e N o t e
This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assesses the status of Iran’s nuclear program, and the
program’s outlook over the next 10 years. This time frame is more appropriate for estimating
capabilities than intentions and foreign reactions, which are more difficult to estimate over a
decade. In presenting the Intelligence Community’s assessment of Iranian nuclear intentions and
capabilities, the NIE thoroughly reviews all available information on these questions, examines
the range of reasonable scenarios consistent with this information, and describes the key factors
we judge would drive or impede nuclear progress in Iran. This NIE is an extensive
reexamination of the issues in the May 2005 assessment.
This Estimate focuses on the following key questions:
• What are Iran’s intentions toward developing nuclear weapons?
• What domestic factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?
• What external factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?
• What is the range of potential Iranian actions concerning the development of nuclear
weapons, and the decisive factors that would lead Iran to choose one course of action over
another?
• What is Iran’s current and projected capability to develop nuclear weapons? What are our
key assumptions, and Iran’s key chokepoints/vulnerabilities?
This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, it
examines the intelligence to assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire
nuclear weapons, taking full account of Iran’s dual-use uranium fuel cycle and those
nuclear activities that are at least partly civil in nature.
This Estimate does assume that the strategic goals and basic structure of Iran’s senior leadership
and government will remain similar to those that have endured since the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1989. We acknowledge the potential for these to change during the time frame of
the Estimate, but are unable to confidently predict such changes or their implications. This
Estimate does not assess how Iran may conduct future negotiations with the West on the nuclear
issue.
This Estimate incorporates intelligence reporting available as of 31 October 2007.
What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language
We use phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimate—and probabilistic terms such as
probably and likely—to convey analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are not
facts, proof, or knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on collected
information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on previous
judgments. In all cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have
“proof” that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.
In addition to conveying judgments rather than certainty, our estimative language also often
conveys 1) our assessed likelihood or probability of an event; and 2) the level of confidence we
ascribe to the judgment.
Estimates of Likelihood. Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic
language to reflect the Community’s estimates of the likelihood of developments or events.
Terms such as probably, likely, very likely, or almost certainly indicate a greater than even
chance. The terms unlikely and remote indicate a less then even chance that an event will occur;
they do not imply that an event will not occur. Terms such as might or may reflect situations in
which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally because relevant information is
unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as we cannot dismiss, we cannot rule out, or we
cannot discount reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose consequences are such
that it warrants mentioning. The chart provides a rough idea of the relationship of some of these
terms to each other.
Remote Very Even Probably/ Very Almost
unlikely Unlikely chance Likely likely certainly
Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that
varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of
confidence to our assessments, as follows:
• High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality
information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment.
A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still
carry a risk of being wrong.
• Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible
but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of
confidence.
• Low confidence generally means that the information’s credibility and/or plausibility is
questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid
analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.
Key Judgments
A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
undeclared nuclear work.
• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged
previously.
B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would
need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge
with high confidence it has not yet done.
C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough
fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge
1 For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design
and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we
do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.
enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons
program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating
them.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be
technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
(INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing
to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its
options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt
it to restart the program.
• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived
by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
is inherently reversible.
F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—
rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium
conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been
restarted through at least mid-2007.
G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
Key Differences Between the Key Judgments of This Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear
Program and the May 2005 Assessment
2005 IC Estimate 2007 National Intelligence Estimate
Assess with high confidence that Iran
currently is determined to develop nuclear
weapons despite its international
obligations and international pressure, but
we do not assess that Iran is immovable.
Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,
Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge
with high confidence that the halt lasted at least
several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate
confidence that the halt to those activities
represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons
program.) Assess with moderate confidence
Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know
whether it currently intends to develop nuclear
weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt
was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from
exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear
work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence
that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the
option to develop nuclear weapons.
We have moderate confidence in projecting
when Iran is likely to make a nuclear
weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before
early-to-mid next decade.
We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate
confidence Iran probably would be technically
capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR
judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this
capability before 2013 because of foreseeable
technical and programmatic problems.)
Iran could produce enough fissile material
for a weapon by the end of this decade if it
were to make more rapid and successful
progress than we have seen to date.
We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely.
Tuesday, December 04, 2007
Saturday, November 24, 2007
IAEA's report on iran, nov 15,2007
Board of Governors GOV/2007/58
Date: 15 November 2007
Restricted Distribution
Original: English
For official use only
Item 3(c) of the revised provisional agenda
(GOV/2007/60/Rev.1)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747
(2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 30 August 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/48 and
Corr.1). This report covers the relevant developments since that date.
A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues
2. On 21 August 2007, the Secretariat and Iran reached understandings on a work plan for
resolving outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment). Since the
previous report, the following progress has been made in the implementation of the work plan.
A.1. P-1 and P-2 Centrifuges
3. The chronology of activities since the previous report is as follows:
xOn 31 August 2007, the Agency provided to Iran in writing the outstanding questions
relating to the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme;
xOn 24 and 25 September 2007, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and
Iranian officials to clarify the questions provided to Iran;
xFrom 9 to 11 October 2007, another meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and
the Iranian authorities, at which Iran provided oral answers to the questions and the Agency
requested additional clarifications and amplifications;.GOV/2007/58
Page 2
xOn 15 October 2007, the Agency received preliminary written answers to the questions;
xFrom 20 to 24 October 2007, an Agency technical team visited Tehran to review in detail the
answers and supporting documentation, and to interview officials involved in the P-1 and P-2
uranium enrichment programme;
xFrom 29 October to 1 November 2007, the Agency continued discussions with the Iranian
authorities on the centrifuge enrichment programme. Iran provided additional supporting
documentation and written amplifications and the Agency held discussions and interviews
with Iranian officials involved in nuclear activities in the 1980s and 1990s;
xOn 5 and 12 November 2007, Iran provided in writing its response to the Agency’s questions
about the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme.
A.1.1. Acquisition of Fuel Cycle Facilities and Technology 1972–1995
4. According to Iran, in its early years, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) concluded
a number of contracts with entities from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
of America to enable it to acquire nuclear power and a wide range of related nuclear fuel cycle
services, but after the 1979 revolution, these contracts with a total value of around $10 billion were not
fulfilled. Iran noted that one of the contracts, signed in 1976, was for the development of a pilot plant
for laser enrichment
1
. Senior Iranian officials said that, in the mid-1980s, Iran started working with
many countries to revitalize its nuclear programme to meet the State’s growing energy needs. Taking
advantage of investments already made, Iran said it focused its efforts initially on the completion of
the Bushehr nuclear power plant, working with entities from, inter alia, Argentina, France, Germany
and Spain, but without success. At that time, Iran also initiated efforts to acquire research reactors
from Argentina, China, India and the former Soviet Union, but also without success.
5. Parallel to the activities related to nuclear power plants, Iran started to build supporting
infrastructure by establishing nuclear technology centres in Esfahan and Karaj. However, apart from
uranium conversion technology acquired from an entity in China, Iran was not able to acquire other
nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technology from abroad. As a result, according to Iran, a decision was
made in the mid-1980s to acquire uranium enrichment technology on the black market.
6. To assess the detailed information provided by Iran, the Agency held discussions with senior
current and former Iranian officials. The Agency also examined supporting documentation, including
Iranian legislation, contracts with foreign companies, agreements with other States and nuclear site
surveys.
7. Bearing in mind the long history and complexity of the programme and the dual nature of
enrichment technology, the Agency is not in a position, based on the information currently available to
it, to draw conclusions about the original underlying nature of parts of the programme. Further light
may be shed on this question when other aspects of the work plan have been addressed and when the
Agency has been able to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
__________________________________________________________________________________ 1
In addition to the 1976 contract for the laser enrichment pilot plant, concluded with a US company, Iran has reported the conclusion of the
following contracts related to laser enrichment (GOV/2004/60, Annex, para. 30):
•1975 – for the establishment of a laboratory to study the spectroscopic behaviour of uranium metal (Germany);
•1991 – for the establishment of a Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory and a Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (China);
•1998 – to obtain information related to laser enrichment, and the supply of relevant equipment (Russian Federation)..GOV/2007/58
Page 3
A.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 Centrifuge Technology
The 1987 Offer
8. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2005/67, paras 14–15), the Agency was shown by
Iran in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer for certain
components and equipment said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. Iran
stated in 2005 that this was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and
content of the 1987 offer. On 9 October 2007, the Agency was provided with a copy of the document.
Certain aspects of the document indicate that it dates from 1987. However, the originator of the
document has still not been identified.
9. On 5 November 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of meetings
between Iran and the supply network covering the period 1986 to 1987. Iran maintains that only some
components of two disassembled centrifuges, plus supporting drawings and specifications, were
delivered in 1987 by the network. Iran reiterated that it did not acquire uranium casting and re-
conversion technology or equipment from the network, nor did it ask for the 15-page document
describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal, and its casting into hemispheres
(GOV/2005/87, para. 6). These points are addressed in A.3 below.
10. According to Iran, the decision to acquire centrifuge technology was taken by the President of
the AEOI and endorsed by the Prime Minister of Iran. In response to its enquiries about possible
additional documentation relevant to the 1987 offer, the Agency was provided on 8 November 2007
with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to the Prime Minister,
dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister’s endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In
his communication, the AEOI President indicated that the activities "should be treated fully
confidentially." In response to the Agency’s enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement
in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision-
making process or in the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.
11. Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, limited
documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected through the Agency’s
independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements are consistent with other
information available to the Agency concerning Iran’s acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge
enrichment technology in 1987.
Early Research and Development
12. Iran has stated that, during the first phase of P-1 research and development (R&D) in 1987–
1993, it devoted only limited financial and human resources (three researchers) to the project.
According to Iran, emphasis was put on understanding the behaviour of centrifuges and their assembly
and on domestic production of components. Iran has also stated that during this period, the R&D work
was conducted only by the AEOI, without the support of universities or the Physics Research Centre
(PHRC). According to Iran, no contacts were made during this period with the supply network to seek
support in solving technical problems which Iran had encountered.
13. Iran’s statements about this phase of R&D are not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings,
which are based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network,
supporting documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected during the
Agency’s investigations. However, the role of the technical university at which uranium particle
contamination was found still needs to be examined (see A.2 below)..GOV/2007/58
Page 4
The 1993 Offer and Subsequent R&D
14. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2006/15, para. 15), statements made by Iran and key
members of the supply network about the events leading up to the mid-1990s offer have been at
variance with each other. Over the course of meetings held in October 2007, Iran provided the Agency
with an updated chronology of events from 1993 to 1999 which clarified certain details concerning
meetings, participants and deliveries of P-1 centrifuge equipment by the network during this period.
15. Iran stated again that in 1993 the supply network, on its own initiative, had approached an
Iranian company with an offer to sell enrichment technology. This offer was brought to the attention
of the Head of Iran’s Budget and Planning Organization, who was also a member of the country’s
Atomic Energy Council. The offer was then further pursued by the AEOI (GOV/2005/67, para. 16).
16. The Agency has so far not been able to confirm Iran’s statement that the supply network
initiated the 1993 offer. Information provided by Iran on the deliveries and technical meetings after
1993 is consistent with that given to the Agency in interviews with some of the network members.
Based on interviews with Libyan officials and supply network members and information from other
sources, the Agency has concluded that most of the items related to the 1993 offer had originally been
ordered by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya but were in fact delivered to Iran in the period 1994–1996.
17. Iran stated that, during the period 1993 to 1999, it was still experiencing difficulty in producing
components for P-1 centrifuges and manufacturing reliable P-1 centrifuges. It said that only limited
human resources were devoted to the project until 1997 and that, around 1998, additional theoretical
and experimental studies were initiated at the Amir Khabir University. Its statements in this regard are
supported by the technical questions raised by AEOI staff with the network and procurement
information available to the Agency.
18. Iran stated that it successfully tested P-1 centrifuges at the end of the 1990s and that a decision
was made to go ahead with larger-scale R&D and eventually with an enrichment plant. To that end,
Iran stated that it considered locations at Hashtgerd Karaj, Natanz and Esfahan before deciding to
build the enrichment plant at Natanz. During this period, procurement activities were intensified and
vacuum equipment, as well as special raw materials such as maraging steel and high strength
aluminium, were acquired from abroad. Iran has provided names, locations and activities of the
workshops involved in the domestic production of centrifuge components, most of which are owned
by military industrial organizations (GOV/2004/11, para. 37). Information provided by Iran on the
timing of these purchases and the quantities involved is consistent with the Agency’s findings.
A.1.3. Acquisition of P-2 Centrifuge Technology
19. Iran has stated that, in order to compensate it for the poor quality of the P-1 centrifuge
components provided by the supply network, the network provided Iran at a meeting in Dubai in 1996
with a full set of general P-2 centrifuge drawings. This statement was confirmed to the Agency in
interviews with key members of the network.
20. Iran has reiterated that, although the drawings were acquired in 1996, no work on P-2
centrifuges was begun until 2002. According to the former and current senior management of the
AEOI, Iran did not yet have the technical and scientific capabilities to master centrifuge
manufacturing during this period. The Agency does not have credible procurement related information
pointing to the actual acquisition by Iran of P-2 centrifuges or components during this period (an
earlier indication which appeared to support this (GOV/2006/15, para. 18) could not be substantiated)..GOV/2007/58
Page 5
21. In 2002, the AEOI concluded a contract with a private company to manufacture a modified P-2
centrifuge (GOV/2004/11, para. 45). On 5 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the
contract, the content of which is consistent with earlier interviews with the company owner, who was
not available for interview on this occasion. The contract was terminated in March 2003, but the
company owner has stated that he continued to work "on his own initiative" until June 2003.
22. The owner of the company stated in earlier interviews that he was able to obtain all raw
materials and minor items, with the exception of bearings, oils and magnets, from domestic sources,
which is consistent with the procurement information currently available to the Agency. The owner
stated that he acquired 150 magnets with P-2 specifications and attempted to buy tens of thousands
more, but these orders were cancelled by the suppliers. The AEOI stated that, after termination of his
contract with the AEOI, the company owner sought to secure the supply of additional magnets for the
AEOI but that his attempts to do so failed, which is consistent with the information available to the
Agency through its investigations. Iran acknowledged that composite rotors for P-2 centrifuges had
been manufactured in a workshop situated on a Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) site
(GOV/2004/34, para. 22).
23. Based on visits made by Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshop in 2004, examination of the
company owner’s contract, progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement
enquiries, the Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D
activities are consistent with the Agency’s findings. Environmental samples taken at declared R&D
locations and from equipment did not indicate that nuclear material was used in these experiments.
A.2. Source of Contamination
24. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions in writing in connection with
the source of uranium particle contamination at the technical university and requested access to
relevant documentation and to individuals, as well as to relevant equipment and locations for sample-
taking. The questions were, inter alia, about the origin of the uranium particle contamination of
equipment (GOV/2006/53, para. 24), the nature of the equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment
and the names and roles of individuals and entities involved (including PHRC). In accordance with the
work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few
weeks.
A.3. Uranium Metal Document
25. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the 15-page document describing the
procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres. Iran has
reiterated that this document was received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987. The
Agency has shared this document with Pakistan, the purported country of origin, and is seeking more
information. Iran stated that the reconversion unit with casting equipment mentioned in the one-page
1987 offer was not pursued with the supply network. Apart from the conversion experiments of UF4 to
uranium metal at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (GOV/2004/60 Annex, para. 2), the Agency has
seen no indication of any UF6 reconversion and casting activity in Iran. It should be noted, however,
that a small UF6 to uranium metal conversion line in the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was
declared by Iran in the design information questionnaire for the UCF (GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, para.
3). This line has not been built, as verified by the Agency’s inspectors.
A.4. Polonium-210
26. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning Iran’s
activities involving polonium and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and.GOV/2007/58
Page 6
equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the scope and objectives of the polonium-210 studies
(GOV/2004/11, para. 28), whether any bismuth acquisitions from abroad had been made or attempted
and whether any related theoretical or R&D studies had been carried out in Iran. In accordance with
the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few
weeks.
A.5. Gchine Mine
27. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning the Gchine
Mine and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and equipment. The questions were,
inter alia, about the ownership of the mining area and mill, why activities took place at this location
when suitable infrastructure was available elsewhere and why AEOI activities at the mine ceased
around 1993 (GOV/2005/67, para. 26). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers
to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.
A.6. Alleged Studies
28. The Agency has urged Iran to address at an early date the alleged studies concerning the
conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (the green salt project), high explosive testing and the design
of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/15, paras 38–39). In accordance with the work plan, Iran
should address this topic in the next few weeks. In the meantime, the Agency is working on
arrangements for sharing with Iran documents provided by third parties related to the alleged studies.
A.7. Facility Attachment for the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
29. On 17 and 18 September 2007, an Agency technical team discussed with the Iranian authorities
details of a draft Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. Further
discussions from 20 to 24 September led to the entry into force of the Facility Attachment on
30 September 2007.
B. Current Enrichment Related Activities
30. On 3 November 2007, the Agency verified that Iran had finished installing eighteen 164-
machine cascades at FEP and that UF6 had been fed into all 18 cascades. There has been no
installation of centrifuges or centrifuge pipework outside the original 18-cascade area. Work to install
feed and withdrawal infrastructure and auxiliary systems is continuing.
31. Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 1240 kg of UF6 into the cascades at FEP. The
feed rate has remained below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While Iran has stated
that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, the highest U-235 enrichment
measured so far from the environmental samples taken by the Agency from cascade components and
related equipment is 4.0%. Detailed nuclear material accountancy will be carried out during the annual
physical inventory taking which is scheduled from 16 to 19 December 2007. Since March 2007, a total
of seven unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP.
32. Since August 2007, Iran has continued to test single centrifuge machines, the 10- and 20-
machine cascades and one 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between
23 July and 22 October 2007, Iran fed 5 kg of UF6 into the single machines; no nuclear material was.GOV/2007/58
Page 7
fed into the cascades. From 15 to 18 September 2007, the Agency performed a physical inventory
verification at PFEP. Although some of the sample results are not yet available, the Agency’s
provisional evaluation tends to confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran.
33. There have been several press reports about statements by high level Iranian officials
concerning R&D and testing of P-2 centrifuges by Iran (GOV/2006/27, para. 14). In a communication
to the Agency received on 8 November 2007, Iran wrote: "Iran voluntarily has informed the IAEA on
the status of mechanical test (without UF6 feeding) of new generation of centrifuge design." In the
communication, Iran added that it "agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation
information" would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007.
C. Reprocessing Activities
34. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the
MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design
information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at
those facilities.
D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
35. On 11 November 2007, the Agency conducted design information verification at the IR-40 and
noted that construction of the facility was proceeding. Satellite imagery appears to indicate that the
Heavy Water Production Plant is operating. The Agency must rely on satellite imagery of this plant as
it does not have routine access to it while the Additional Protocol remains unimplemented.
E. Other Implementation Issues
E.1. Uranium Conversion
36. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007,
approximately 78 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced as of 5 November 2007.
This brings the total amount of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to approximately 266 tonnes,
all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance..GOV/2007/58
Page 8
E.2. Design Information
37. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the
implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1.
(GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14)
2
, but there has been no progress on this issue.
E.3. Other Matters
38. The Agency has made arrangements to verify and seal the fresh fuel foreseen for the Bushehr
nuclear power plant on 26 November 2007, before shipment of the fuel from the Russian Federation
to Iran.
F. Summary
39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran
has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required
nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran
concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the
Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to
the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about
Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.
40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction
of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.
41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme: Iran’s past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The
Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge
programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek
corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations. The Agency intends
in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other
activities that could have military applications.
42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to
questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work
plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran’s
active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the
work plan.
43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present
programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that
the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally
__________________________________________________________________________________
2
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part as agreed to in 1976 provides for the submission of design information for new
facilities "normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time", in contrast to the
modified text agreed to in 2003, which provides for the submission of such information as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize
construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier..GOV/2007/58
Page 9
importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the
Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible
current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide
credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full
implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran’s
undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively
peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to
implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to
implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the
suspension of all enrichment related activities.
44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Date: 15 November 2007
Restricted Distribution
Original: English
For official use only
Item 3(c) of the revised provisional agenda
(GOV/2007/60/Rev.1)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747
(2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 30 August 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/48 and
Corr.1). This report covers the relevant developments since that date.
A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues
2. On 21 August 2007, the Secretariat and Iran reached understandings on a work plan for
resolving outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment). Since the
previous report, the following progress has been made in the implementation of the work plan.
A.1. P-1 and P-2 Centrifuges
3. The chronology of activities since the previous report is as follows:
xOn 31 August 2007, the Agency provided to Iran in writing the outstanding questions
relating to the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme;
xOn 24 and 25 September 2007, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and
Iranian officials to clarify the questions provided to Iran;
xFrom 9 to 11 October 2007, another meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and
the Iranian authorities, at which Iran provided oral answers to the questions and the Agency
requested additional clarifications and amplifications;.GOV/2007/58
Page 2
xOn 15 October 2007, the Agency received preliminary written answers to the questions;
xFrom 20 to 24 October 2007, an Agency technical team visited Tehran to review in detail the
answers and supporting documentation, and to interview officials involved in the P-1 and P-2
uranium enrichment programme;
xFrom 29 October to 1 November 2007, the Agency continued discussions with the Iranian
authorities on the centrifuge enrichment programme. Iran provided additional supporting
documentation and written amplifications and the Agency held discussions and interviews
with Iranian officials involved in nuclear activities in the 1980s and 1990s;
xOn 5 and 12 November 2007, Iran provided in writing its response to the Agency’s questions
about the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme.
A.1.1. Acquisition of Fuel Cycle Facilities and Technology 1972–1995
4. According to Iran, in its early years, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) concluded
a number of contracts with entities from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
of America to enable it to acquire nuclear power and a wide range of related nuclear fuel cycle
services, but after the 1979 revolution, these contracts with a total value of around $10 billion were not
fulfilled. Iran noted that one of the contracts, signed in 1976, was for the development of a pilot plant
for laser enrichment
1
. Senior Iranian officials said that, in the mid-1980s, Iran started working with
many countries to revitalize its nuclear programme to meet the State’s growing energy needs. Taking
advantage of investments already made, Iran said it focused its efforts initially on the completion of
the Bushehr nuclear power plant, working with entities from, inter alia, Argentina, France, Germany
and Spain, but without success. At that time, Iran also initiated efforts to acquire research reactors
from Argentina, China, India and the former Soviet Union, but also without success.
5. Parallel to the activities related to nuclear power plants, Iran started to build supporting
infrastructure by establishing nuclear technology centres in Esfahan and Karaj. However, apart from
uranium conversion technology acquired from an entity in China, Iran was not able to acquire other
nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technology from abroad. As a result, according to Iran, a decision was
made in the mid-1980s to acquire uranium enrichment technology on the black market.
6. To assess the detailed information provided by Iran, the Agency held discussions with senior
current and former Iranian officials. The Agency also examined supporting documentation, including
Iranian legislation, contracts with foreign companies, agreements with other States and nuclear site
surveys.
7. Bearing in mind the long history and complexity of the programme and the dual nature of
enrichment technology, the Agency is not in a position, based on the information currently available to
it, to draw conclusions about the original underlying nature of parts of the programme. Further light
may be shed on this question when other aspects of the work plan have been addressed and when the
Agency has been able to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
__________________________________________________________________________________ 1
In addition to the 1976 contract for the laser enrichment pilot plant, concluded with a US company, Iran has reported the conclusion of the
following contracts related to laser enrichment (GOV/2004/60, Annex, para. 30):
•1975 – for the establishment of a laboratory to study the spectroscopic behaviour of uranium metal (Germany);
•1991 – for the establishment of a Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory and a Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (China);
•1998 – to obtain information related to laser enrichment, and the supply of relevant equipment (Russian Federation)..GOV/2007/58
Page 3
A.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 Centrifuge Technology
The 1987 Offer
8. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2005/67, paras 14–15), the Agency was shown by
Iran in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer for certain
components and equipment said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. Iran
stated in 2005 that this was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and
content of the 1987 offer. On 9 October 2007, the Agency was provided with a copy of the document.
Certain aspects of the document indicate that it dates from 1987. However, the originator of the
document has still not been identified.
9. On 5 November 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of meetings
between Iran and the supply network covering the period 1986 to 1987. Iran maintains that only some
components of two disassembled centrifuges, plus supporting drawings and specifications, were
delivered in 1987 by the network. Iran reiterated that it did not acquire uranium casting and re-
conversion technology or equipment from the network, nor did it ask for the 15-page document
describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal, and its casting into hemispheres
(GOV/2005/87, para. 6). These points are addressed in A.3 below.
10. According to Iran, the decision to acquire centrifuge technology was taken by the President of
the AEOI and endorsed by the Prime Minister of Iran. In response to its enquiries about possible
additional documentation relevant to the 1987 offer, the Agency was provided on 8 November 2007
with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to the Prime Minister,
dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister’s endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In
his communication, the AEOI President indicated that the activities "should be treated fully
confidentially." In response to the Agency’s enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement
in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision-
making process or in the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.
11. Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, limited
documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected through the Agency’s
independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements are consistent with other
information available to the Agency concerning Iran’s acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge
enrichment technology in 1987.
Early Research and Development
12. Iran has stated that, during the first phase of P-1 research and development (R&D) in 1987–
1993, it devoted only limited financial and human resources (three researchers) to the project.
According to Iran, emphasis was put on understanding the behaviour of centrifuges and their assembly
and on domestic production of components. Iran has also stated that during this period, the R&D work
was conducted only by the AEOI, without the support of universities or the Physics Research Centre
(PHRC). According to Iran, no contacts were made during this period with the supply network to seek
support in solving technical problems which Iran had encountered.
13. Iran’s statements about this phase of R&D are not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings,
which are based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network,
supporting documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected during the
Agency’s investigations. However, the role of the technical university at which uranium particle
contamination was found still needs to be examined (see A.2 below)..GOV/2007/58
Page 4
The 1993 Offer and Subsequent R&D
14. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2006/15, para. 15), statements made by Iran and key
members of the supply network about the events leading up to the mid-1990s offer have been at
variance with each other. Over the course of meetings held in October 2007, Iran provided the Agency
with an updated chronology of events from 1993 to 1999 which clarified certain details concerning
meetings, participants and deliveries of P-1 centrifuge equipment by the network during this period.
15. Iran stated again that in 1993 the supply network, on its own initiative, had approached an
Iranian company with an offer to sell enrichment technology. This offer was brought to the attention
of the Head of Iran’s Budget and Planning Organization, who was also a member of the country’s
Atomic Energy Council. The offer was then further pursued by the AEOI (GOV/2005/67, para. 16).
16. The Agency has so far not been able to confirm Iran’s statement that the supply network
initiated the 1993 offer. Information provided by Iran on the deliveries and technical meetings after
1993 is consistent with that given to the Agency in interviews with some of the network members.
Based on interviews with Libyan officials and supply network members and information from other
sources, the Agency has concluded that most of the items related to the 1993 offer had originally been
ordered by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya but were in fact delivered to Iran in the period 1994–1996.
17. Iran stated that, during the period 1993 to 1999, it was still experiencing difficulty in producing
components for P-1 centrifuges and manufacturing reliable P-1 centrifuges. It said that only limited
human resources were devoted to the project until 1997 and that, around 1998, additional theoretical
and experimental studies were initiated at the Amir Khabir University. Its statements in this regard are
supported by the technical questions raised by AEOI staff with the network and procurement
information available to the Agency.
18. Iran stated that it successfully tested P-1 centrifuges at the end of the 1990s and that a decision
was made to go ahead with larger-scale R&D and eventually with an enrichment plant. To that end,
Iran stated that it considered locations at Hashtgerd Karaj, Natanz and Esfahan before deciding to
build the enrichment plant at Natanz. During this period, procurement activities were intensified and
vacuum equipment, as well as special raw materials such as maraging steel and high strength
aluminium, were acquired from abroad. Iran has provided names, locations and activities of the
workshops involved in the domestic production of centrifuge components, most of which are owned
by military industrial organizations (GOV/2004/11, para. 37). Information provided by Iran on the
timing of these purchases and the quantities involved is consistent with the Agency’s findings.
A.1.3. Acquisition of P-2 Centrifuge Technology
19. Iran has stated that, in order to compensate it for the poor quality of the P-1 centrifuge
components provided by the supply network, the network provided Iran at a meeting in Dubai in 1996
with a full set of general P-2 centrifuge drawings. This statement was confirmed to the Agency in
interviews with key members of the network.
20. Iran has reiterated that, although the drawings were acquired in 1996, no work on P-2
centrifuges was begun until 2002. According to the former and current senior management of the
AEOI, Iran did not yet have the technical and scientific capabilities to master centrifuge
manufacturing during this period. The Agency does not have credible procurement related information
pointing to the actual acquisition by Iran of P-2 centrifuges or components during this period (an
earlier indication which appeared to support this (GOV/2006/15, para. 18) could not be substantiated)..GOV/2007/58
Page 5
21. In 2002, the AEOI concluded a contract with a private company to manufacture a modified P-2
centrifuge (GOV/2004/11, para. 45). On 5 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the
contract, the content of which is consistent with earlier interviews with the company owner, who was
not available for interview on this occasion. The contract was terminated in March 2003, but the
company owner has stated that he continued to work "on his own initiative" until June 2003.
22. The owner of the company stated in earlier interviews that he was able to obtain all raw
materials and minor items, with the exception of bearings, oils and magnets, from domestic sources,
which is consistent with the procurement information currently available to the Agency. The owner
stated that he acquired 150 magnets with P-2 specifications and attempted to buy tens of thousands
more, but these orders were cancelled by the suppliers. The AEOI stated that, after termination of his
contract with the AEOI, the company owner sought to secure the supply of additional magnets for the
AEOI but that his attempts to do so failed, which is consistent with the information available to the
Agency through its investigations. Iran acknowledged that composite rotors for P-2 centrifuges had
been manufactured in a workshop situated on a Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) site
(GOV/2004/34, para. 22).
23. Based on visits made by Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshop in 2004, examination of the
company owner’s contract, progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement
enquiries, the Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D
activities are consistent with the Agency’s findings. Environmental samples taken at declared R&D
locations and from equipment did not indicate that nuclear material was used in these experiments.
A.2. Source of Contamination
24. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions in writing in connection with
the source of uranium particle contamination at the technical university and requested access to
relevant documentation and to individuals, as well as to relevant equipment and locations for sample-
taking. The questions were, inter alia, about the origin of the uranium particle contamination of
equipment (GOV/2006/53, para. 24), the nature of the equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment
and the names and roles of individuals and entities involved (including PHRC). In accordance with the
work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few
weeks.
A.3. Uranium Metal Document
25. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the 15-page document describing the
procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres. Iran has
reiterated that this document was received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987. The
Agency has shared this document with Pakistan, the purported country of origin, and is seeking more
information. Iran stated that the reconversion unit with casting equipment mentioned in the one-page
1987 offer was not pursued with the supply network. Apart from the conversion experiments of UF4 to
uranium metal at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (GOV/2004/60 Annex, para. 2), the Agency has
seen no indication of any UF6 reconversion and casting activity in Iran. It should be noted, however,
that a small UF6 to uranium metal conversion line in the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was
declared by Iran in the design information questionnaire for the UCF (GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, para.
3). This line has not been built, as verified by the Agency’s inspectors.
A.4. Polonium-210
26. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning Iran’s
activities involving polonium and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and.GOV/2007/58
Page 6
equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the scope and objectives of the polonium-210 studies
(GOV/2004/11, para. 28), whether any bismuth acquisitions from abroad had been made or attempted
and whether any related theoretical or R&D studies had been carried out in Iran. In accordance with
the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few
weeks.
A.5. Gchine Mine
27. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning the Gchine
Mine and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and equipment. The questions were,
inter alia, about the ownership of the mining area and mill, why activities took place at this location
when suitable infrastructure was available elsewhere and why AEOI activities at the mine ceased
around 1993 (GOV/2005/67, para. 26). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers
to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.
A.6. Alleged Studies
28. The Agency has urged Iran to address at an early date the alleged studies concerning the
conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (the green salt project), high explosive testing and the design
of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/15, paras 38–39). In accordance with the work plan, Iran
should address this topic in the next few weeks. In the meantime, the Agency is working on
arrangements for sharing with Iran documents provided by third parties related to the alleged studies.
A.7. Facility Attachment for the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
29. On 17 and 18 September 2007, an Agency technical team discussed with the Iranian authorities
details of a draft Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. Further
discussions from 20 to 24 September led to the entry into force of the Facility Attachment on
30 September 2007.
B. Current Enrichment Related Activities
30. On 3 November 2007, the Agency verified that Iran had finished installing eighteen 164-
machine cascades at FEP and that UF6 had been fed into all 18 cascades. There has been no
installation of centrifuges or centrifuge pipework outside the original 18-cascade area. Work to install
feed and withdrawal infrastructure and auxiliary systems is continuing.
31. Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 1240 kg of UF6 into the cascades at FEP. The
feed rate has remained below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While Iran has stated
that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, the highest U-235 enrichment
measured so far from the environmental samples taken by the Agency from cascade components and
related equipment is 4.0%. Detailed nuclear material accountancy will be carried out during the annual
physical inventory taking which is scheduled from 16 to 19 December 2007. Since March 2007, a total
of seven unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP.
32. Since August 2007, Iran has continued to test single centrifuge machines, the 10- and 20-
machine cascades and one 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between
23 July and 22 October 2007, Iran fed 5 kg of UF6 into the single machines; no nuclear material was.GOV/2007/58
Page 7
fed into the cascades. From 15 to 18 September 2007, the Agency performed a physical inventory
verification at PFEP. Although some of the sample results are not yet available, the Agency’s
provisional evaluation tends to confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran.
33. There have been several press reports about statements by high level Iranian officials
concerning R&D and testing of P-2 centrifuges by Iran (GOV/2006/27, para. 14). In a communication
to the Agency received on 8 November 2007, Iran wrote: "Iran voluntarily has informed the IAEA on
the status of mechanical test (without UF6 feeding) of new generation of centrifuge design." In the
communication, Iran added that it "agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation
information" would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007.
C. Reprocessing Activities
34. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the
MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design
information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at
those facilities.
D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
35. On 11 November 2007, the Agency conducted design information verification at the IR-40 and
noted that construction of the facility was proceeding. Satellite imagery appears to indicate that the
Heavy Water Production Plant is operating. The Agency must rely on satellite imagery of this plant as
it does not have routine access to it while the Additional Protocol remains unimplemented.
E. Other Implementation Issues
E.1. Uranium Conversion
36. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007,
approximately 78 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced as of 5 November 2007.
This brings the total amount of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to approximately 266 tonnes,
all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance..GOV/2007/58
Page 8
E.2. Design Information
37. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the
implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1.
(GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14)
2
, but there has been no progress on this issue.
E.3. Other Matters
38. The Agency has made arrangements to verify and seal the fresh fuel foreseen for the Bushehr
nuclear power plant on 26 November 2007, before shipment of the fuel from the Russian Federation
to Iran.
F. Summary
39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran
has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required
nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran
concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the
Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to
the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about
Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.
40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction
of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.
41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme: Iran’s past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The
Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge
programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek
corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations. The Agency intends
in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other
activities that could have military applications.
42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to
questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work
plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran’s
active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the
work plan.
43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present
programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that
the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally
__________________________________________________________________________________
2
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part as agreed to in 1976 provides for the submission of design information for new
facilities "normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time", in contrast to the
modified text agreed to in 2003, which provides for the submission of such information as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize
construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier..GOV/2007/58
Page 9
importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the
Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible
current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide
credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full
implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran’s
undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively
peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to
implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to
implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the
suspension of all enrichment related activities.
44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Friday, November 23, 2007
sanctions resolution on Iran, 1747 /security council
United Nations S/RES/1747 (2007)
Security Council Distr.: General
24 March 2007
07-28140 (E)
*0728140*
Resolution 1747 (2007)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on
24 March 2007
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,
and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of
23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and
II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as
set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),
Recalling the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of
22 February 2007 and deploring that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply
with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear
non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a
negotiated solution,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),
which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and
with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of
sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such.S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 2
time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have
been met,
Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of
Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), mindful of its primary
responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by
the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to
build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and
to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran
shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737
(2006);
2. Calls upon all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and
decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant
to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein "the Committee") of the entry
into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to
resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons
designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly
associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including
through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment,
materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4
of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related
to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;
3. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse
its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the
implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the
objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where Article XV
of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I
to this resolution;
5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or
related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items
from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in the territory of Iran;.S/RES/1747 (2007)
3 07-28140
6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale
or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using
their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance
or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the
transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of
arms;
7. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter
into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and
developmental purposes;
8. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;
9. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international
community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming
to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the
IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
10. Wel comes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a
negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006
proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were
endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and acknowledges with
appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term
comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and
cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;
11. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA,
strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and
encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing
professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the
framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is
internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with
safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for
non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify
all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;
12. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the
IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian.S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 4
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other
provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of
Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
13. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to
in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as
Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in
order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as
soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12
above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of
Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that
Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of
the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such
additional measures be necessary;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter..S/RES/1747 (2007)
5 07-28140
Annex I
Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition
Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution
1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and
controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006))
2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of
Iran’s (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is
involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737
(2006))
3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass
fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear
programme)
4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition,
explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEOI’s research division)
6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has
transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran’s nuclear
programme)
7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group)
(Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles
including cruise missiles)
8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for
the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid
Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG),
both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment
on AIO’s behalf for the missile programme)
10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in
international purchases of missile equipment)
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities
1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
parachutes, para-gliders, para-motors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare
doctrine)
2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171,
used by IRGC Air Force)
3. Sho’a’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as
part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine).S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 6
Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics,
working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)
2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of
the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about
the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)
3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center,
which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company,
which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737
(2006) for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a
MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme.
The Shahab-3 is Iran’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)
8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah,
which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG,
both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons
1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)
2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground
Forces)
4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)
5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)
7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs).S/RES/1747 (2007)
7 07-28140
Annex II
Elements of a long-term agreement
Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with Iran, based on mutual
respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We propose a fresh
start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such an agreement
would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
endorsed in a Security Council resolution.
To create the right conditions for negotiations,
We will:
• Reaffirm Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in
conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support
for the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme.
• Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in Iran
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT.
• Agree to suspend discussion of Iran’s nuclear programme in the Security
Council upon the resumption of negotiations.
Iran will:
• Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full
cooperation with IAEA.
• Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by
IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council,
and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
• Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a
long-term agreement
1. Nuclear
We will take the following steps:
Iran’s rights to nuclear energy
• Reaffirm Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and
cooperate with Iran in the development by Iran of a civil nuclear power
programme.
• Negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement..S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 8
Light water reactors
• Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of
necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power
reactors safe against earthquakes.
• Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.
Research and development in nuclear energy
• Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation,
including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the
fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in
medicine and agriculture.
Fuel guarantees
• Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to Iran, based on:
. Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide
enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran’s nuclear
reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium
hexaflouride (UF6) produced in Iran.
. Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of
up to five years’ supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with the
participation and under supervision of IAEA.
. Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for
reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next
meeting of the Board of Governors.
Review of moratorium
The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build
international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its
aspects, to follow:
• Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it,
including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have
been resolved;
• Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in
Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran’s civil nuclear programme has been restored.
2. Political and economic
Regional security cooperation
Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional
security issues..S/RES/1747 (2007)
9 07-28140
International trade and investment
Improving Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital,
through practical support for full integration into international structures, including
the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct
investment in Iran and trade with Iran (including a trade and economic cooperation
agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to
key goods and technology.
Civil aviation
Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on
United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to
Iran, thereby widening the prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil airliners.
Energy partnership
Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between Iran and the
European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.
Telecommunications infrastructure
Support for the modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure and
advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States
and other export restrictions.
High technology cooperation
Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.
Agriculture
Support for agricultural development in Iran, including possible access to
United States and European agricultural products, technology and farm equipment.
Security Council Distr.: General
24 March 2007
07-28140 (E)
*0728140*
Resolution 1747 (2007)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on
24 March 2007
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,
and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of
23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and
II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as
set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),
Recalling the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of
22 February 2007 and deploring that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply
with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear
non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a
negotiated solution,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),
which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and
with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of
sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such.S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 2
time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have
been met,
Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of
Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), mindful of its primary
responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by
the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to
build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and
to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran
shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737
(2006);
2. Calls upon all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and
decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant
to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein "the Committee") of the entry
into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to
resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons
designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly
associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including
through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment,
materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4
of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related
to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;
3. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse
its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the
implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the
objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where Article XV
of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I
to this resolution;
5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or
related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items
from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in the territory of Iran;.S/RES/1747 (2007)
3 07-28140
6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale
or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using
their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance
or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the
transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of
arms;
7. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter
into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and
developmental purposes;
8. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;
9. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international
community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming
to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the
IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
10. Wel comes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a
negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006
proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were
endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and acknowledges with
appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term
comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and
cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;
11. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA,
strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and
encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing
professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the
framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is
internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with
safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for
non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify
all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;
12. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the
IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian.S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 4
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other
provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of
Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
13. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to
in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as
Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in
order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as
soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12
above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of
Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that
Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of
the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such
additional measures be necessary;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter..S/RES/1747 (2007)
5 07-28140
Annex I
Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition
Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution
1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and
controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006))
2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of
Iran’s (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is
involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737
(2006))
3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass
fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear
programme)
4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition,
explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEOI’s research division)
6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has
transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran’s nuclear
programme)
7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group)
(Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles
including cruise missiles)
8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for
the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid
Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG),
both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment
on AIO’s behalf for the missile programme)
10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in
international purchases of missile equipment)
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities
1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
parachutes, para-gliders, para-motors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare
doctrine)
2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171,
used by IRGC Air Force)
3. Sho’a’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as
part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine).S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 6
Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics,
working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)
2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of
the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about
the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)
3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center,
which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company,
which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737
(2006) for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a
MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme.
The Shahab-3 is Iran’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)
8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah,
which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG,
both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons
1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)
2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground
Forces)
4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)
5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)
7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs).S/RES/1747 (2007)
7 07-28140
Annex II
Elements of a long-term agreement
Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with Iran, based on mutual
respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We propose a fresh
start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such an agreement
would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
endorsed in a Security Council resolution.
To create the right conditions for negotiations,
We will:
• Reaffirm Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in
conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support
for the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme.
• Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in Iran
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT.
• Agree to suspend discussion of Iran’s nuclear programme in the Security
Council upon the resumption of negotiations.
Iran will:
• Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full
cooperation with IAEA.
• Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by
IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council,
and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
• Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a
long-term agreement
1. Nuclear
We will take the following steps:
Iran’s rights to nuclear energy
• Reaffirm Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and
cooperate with Iran in the development by Iran of a civil nuclear power
programme.
• Negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement..S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 8
Light water reactors
• Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of
necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power
reactors safe against earthquakes.
• Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.
Research and development in nuclear energy
• Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation,
including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the
fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in
medicine and agriculture.
Fuel guarantees
• Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to Iran, based on:
. Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide
enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran’s nuclear
reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium
hexaflouride (UF6) produced in Iran.
. Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of
up to five years’ supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with the
participation and under supervision of IAEA.
. Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for
reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next
meeting of the Board of Governors.
Review of moratorium
The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build
international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its
aspects, to follow:
• Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it,
including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have
been resolved;
• Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in
Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran’s civil nuclear programme has been restored.
2. Political and economic
Regional security cooperation
Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional
security issues..S/RES/1747 (2007)
9 07-28140
International trade and investment
Improving Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital,
through practical support for full integration into international structures, including
the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct
investment in Iran and trade with Iran (including a trade and economic cooperation
agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to
key goods and technology.
Civil aviation
Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on
United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to
Iran, thereby widening the prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil airliners.
Energy partnership
Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between Iran and the
European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.
Telecommunications infrastructure
Support for the modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure and
advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States
and other export restrictions.
High technology cooperation
Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.
Agriculture
Support for agricultural development in Iran, including possible access to
United States and European agricultural products, technology and farm equipment.
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